Labor and Living as a Black Migrant in Saharatown by Hagan, Ampson
  
 
 
 
 
 
LABOR AND LIVING AS A BLACK MIGRANT IN SAHARATOWN 
 
 
 
 
 
Ampson Hagan 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in the Department 
of Anthropology in the Graduate School. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2017 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
Charles Price 
Jocelyn Chua 
Peter Redfield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 
Ampson Hagan 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ampson Hagan: Labor and Living as a Black Migrant in Saharatown 
(Under the direction of Peter Redfield) 
 
 
This examination of how black African migrants live and work within Arab-Bédouin 
Saharan cities or “Saharatowns,” amid anti-black violence and adverse working 
conditions is a call for thorough ethnographic study of life in such towns. I attempt to call 
attention to the lives of these trans-Saharan migrants, many of whom are stuck in these 
towns for weeks, months and sometimes years. Central to this study is the concept of 
compression, the force from the Saharatowns that catches migrants hoping to pass 
through them only to keep migrants from leaving and pursuing their dreams of another 
life elsewhere. I describe how black African migrants work and make life in Saharatowns, 
with a particular focus on how compression across space and time affects Black peoples 
and allows the socio-juridical institutions of Arab-Bédouin Saharatowns to perpetuate 
anti-blackness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“The Sahara desert isn’t in West Africa!” – Lisa Mueller, political science 
professor in Niamey1 
 
 
Coming in at over 5,000 square miles, the Sahara desert is the largest dry desert 
on Earth. Many misconceptions about the contemporary Sahara exist, including where it 
is and where “it isn’t”. One of the most egregious ones is ‘the Sahara is nothing more 
than a barrier between white (North) and black (sub-Saharan) Africa’.  In Black Morocco, 
Chouki El Hamel explains that in the Moroccan system of racial identity, a peculiar 
inversion of the Western racist model, “one drop” of white blood identifies one as Arab 
(i.e. privileged). This was important in creating a “nationalist” Moroccan Arab majority 
while simultaneously cementing a subjugated black ancestry (composed of those without 
the “one drop” of Arab blood; El Hamel 2014). In the sense of Algerians or other 
Maghrebines immigrating to France, North Africans may not necessarily be viewed as 
white, and often are all considered Arab (Hargreaves 1995; Lazreg 1994; Silverstein 
2004), however, Algerians and other Arab peoples of the Maghreb occupy socio-racial 
positions of power above blacks (while exerting power over blacks for centuries to the 
present), I will call them white in the manner of El Hamel from now on. When I pull at 
the falsehood of the Sahara simply separating white from black, I see two converging 
                                                            
1 Lisa Mueller in discussion with the author, May 2016. 
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elements that guide much of the conventional thinking of the Sahara, especially by many 
North African governments who have embraced nationalist policies over the years: one is 
that nothing happens in the Sahara, and the other is that it merely separates white 
Africans from black Africans. Circulation and perpetuation of these ideas in social 
discourse only obfuscates the realities of the desert and the people within it. 
The Sahara desert is a space of dynamic economic and social movement, 
predicated on the movement of actual bodies into the desert, specifically into Sahara 
cities, what I call “Saharatowns”. These represent the site of a rapid reconfiguration of 
the Sahara, in which the spatial territories of the State and the economic and migratory 
networks of the region come to bear on the cities within the Sahara. This dynamism of 
shifting demographics amid the introduction of new peoples from various places in West 
and Central Africa leads to a considerable urbanization, however, social, economic, 
spatial and racial equilibrium are at stake here as well. The rapid urbanization of the 
Sahara desert region along with high unemployment among Algerian and Nigérien youth 
have served as catalysts for much of the increased migration through the region. The 
Saharatowns of Niger and Algeria are the reflections of two former French colonies with 
two different racial demographics and two different historical trajectories. Peoples of 
several nations, ethnic groups engaging in varied forms of labor comprise the Sahara 
desert, and embrace a distinctive Saharan identity (MacDougall 2012). The introduction 
of many black Africans into traditionally Bédouin cities creates substantial tensions in the 
local context with respect to employment, housing and social interaction, and this 
availability of an unyielding stream of undocumented black migrants, foregrounds the 
conditions under which migrants are subjected and ultimately exploited.  
 3 
The journey for most migrants begins far from the large migration hubs of capital 
cities and sea ports, representing a fragmented journey of stages (Brachet 2012; Collyer 
2007). In fact, many migrants find themselves in much smaller towns that dot the 
migratory path between such hubs, including Saharatowns (Institute Thomas More 2010; 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1 – Trans-Saharan Migration Routes 
 
Researchers and journalists have covered the extensive migration networks and all 
that are trafficked therein, however the literature does not strongly reflect where migrants 
spend most of their time on the migration networks and lines of the maps researchers 
often follow. Scant research exists on migrants living in such places with very little 
ethnographic investigation of black migrants living and working in Saharatowns. Aside 
from the global forces dictating where migrants go, what are the personal and social 
interactions, behaviors, expectations and hopes of migrants? We know their living 
conditions in Saharatowns are generally deplorable, but we know very little about how 
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they experience their living conditions and how those internalized feelings translate to 
their ability and willingness to realize their dreams of leaving the Saharatowns to reach 
North Africa. How do migrants live in these towns on the day-to-day? How do they make 
a living, and how do they make life? These towns specifically harm black life by trapping 
it in racial structures that make life difficult, and by trapping migrants in abject racial-
economic conditions that make it difficult for them to leave. However, people do survive 
and some even escape, but how? Ethnographic study of migrant life in these towns is 
lacking, yet such ethnographic research is necessary if we are to understand how the lives 
and labors of migrant life change over space and time along the migration circuit, and 
how the circuit itself squeezes that migrant life along the way. 
 
Saharan Discourses in Myth and Misunderstanding 
In response to the first myth, much happens in the desert, including migration 
through it, from West Africa to North Africa. Trans-Saharan migration in the late 19th 
and early 21st centuries has mirrored ancient trans-Saharan caravan routes. These routes 
were critical to trade of gold, goods and peoples between West Africa and the 
Mediterranean (Lydon 2009). The Sahara desert has been conventionally viewed as a 
dead space where nothing grows and no one lives. With various nations and peoples 
comprising the Sahara desert and its towns therein, the desert deserves to be treated as a 
dynamic zone of life and the struggle to live for Saharan peoples for centuries, not a 
space of nothingness, and concomitant with that consideration, it merits analysis as a 
space of cosmopolitanism (Claudot-Hawad 2006; Gast 1978; Keenan 1977; Kohl 2015; 
Rassmussen 1998). This consideration is important, as it legitimates this rapid growth of 
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the desert via black migration as part and parcel of modernity-making, a striving or 
aspirational quest for better work opportunities to contribute to the creation of a life one 
could not experience at home. Trans-Saharan migration has helped transform the region 
and continues to reshape the social terrain of the desert. 
To address the second, it is necessary to state that the Sahara is not a barrier 
between white and black Africans, but a space where they have historically intermingled 
for centuries. Moroccans have practiced a refusal to publicly engage in discussions about 
their long history of slavery of black Africans (Haratin) for decades and the Arab-Islamic 
hegemony in North Africa has concealed the issue of its of slavery of blacks and racist 
attitudes towards them (El Hamel 2002). Libya, under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, 
violently targeted and murdered hundreds of black Africans in the country around the 
time of the Libyan Civil War in a nationalist effort to rid itself of “non-Libyans” 
(emphasis mine; Pelham 2011). Historically, the countries of the Maghreb have exhibited 
racist, anti-black views and actions, while the Sahara and the rural towns therein are sites 
of this anti-black legacy at work. Recently, trans-Saharan migration through the region 
has strained social connections between North African Arab-Bédouins (i.e. whites) and 
Sub-Saharan black African migrants working in North African Saharatowns. One of the 
negative effects of the rapid influx of black Africans from West and Central Africa into 
the Saharatowns is rising racial tensions amid high levels of local unemployment and dim 
economic outlooks for locals from those Saharatowns. The anti-black violence in the 
Saharatowns is racism perpetuated by a larger force of the social environment that exerts 
extreme pressure upon black African migrants. I describe this force that explicitly 
threatens the existence and the possibility of black Africans, both socially and physically, 
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as existential compression, a compression located in the Saharatown working on black 
Africans.  The vise grip that a migrant experiences upon living in a Saharatown, that 
dangerous and real possibility of the foreclosure of her dreams as she works to make 
dream fulfillment possible, describes the phenomenon of an existential compression. The 
foreclosure of her desired future follows the threat and pressure of being “stuck” in the 
Saharatown, the first critical element of compression that acts upon and against her and 
other black African migrants in that space. If the dynamic jaw of the vise is the crushing 
threat of a dream deferred, then the static jaw, the second essential element of 
compression, is the juridical foundation against which migrants are crushed. A quick 
internet search will turn up dozens of news reports in which migrants reveal that they 
have been in desert towns for weeks or months on end, struggling to amass the means to 
leave and continue their journeys. One cannot wait for the best paying job or even for 
particular jobs, as the need to quickly accrue income is all encompassing. In this sense, 
migrants are acting against a known, undesirable, crushing future, the failure of their 
migrant mission. However, their present is also difficult. Their present circumstances 
may be orienting them toward the distant, desirable future (one outside of Saharatown 
and presumably north), or towards the immediate, undesirable one (remaining stuck in 
Saharatown). 
Violence against black Africans, discriminatory work arrangements and 
dangerous housing for blacks within Saharatowns may not be understood through the lens 
of critical race theory, which centers on the systemic racism inherent in applications of 
juridical, cultural, and economic American institutions and behaviors of American life. 
As it is particularly American and invested in the racism against black citizens, it is 
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insufficient for describing the anti-black deployment of laws in Algeria or any other 
North African country that ensure order of life for populations assumed to be exclusively 
Arab-Bédouin. The notion of existential compression may offer an extreme, alternative 
mode of understanding for analyzing the constrained condition of life for the black Other 
in the Saharatown. This compression of the Saharatowns specifically punishes black 
African migrants and the conditions inherent within the Saharatowns facilitate this anti-
black African compression. Sites of compression are mobile, created and influenced by 
the politics, desires and relations of many peoples. For migrants traveling from West 
Africa to Algeria or Libya via Niger, the looming site of compression is the Sahara desert.  
Therefore, ethnographic study of the Saharatowns in the context of the colonial histories 
of the region, including the initial state-making and nationalist peopling of the Sahara 
desert, are critical to understanding the lives of contemporary black African trans-
Saharan migrants. 
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TACTICS AGAINST MOVEMENT ACROSS SAHARA AND SEA 
 
Navigations of Destiny 
The Sahara is interesting because, until recently, it has never been a destination 
for migrants. However, beginning in the late 1990s to early 2000s, scores of peoples from 
West and Central Africa migrated to locales in North Africa and in Europe in search of 
economic opportunities not found in their home countries (Adepoju 2003). During that 
time frame, the Sahara desert was not the preferred route to Europe. For many West 
Africans, traveling to Western Sahara (and Morocco) via Mauritania and Senegal was 
much easier, as the Canary Islands lie less than 100 km off the southernmost coast of 
Morocco. The Canary Islands, a small archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean, comprise an 
autonomous community of Spain. Migrants traveled to the southern Morocco and 
northern Western Sahara in the hopes of taking clandestine boat travel to the Canary 
Islands, as the islands represent the most distant outpost of “fortress Europe” (; 
Andersson 2015; Brachet 2015; de Haas 2008). The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) in conjunction with Spanish maritime patrol launched humanitarian 
"interception" campaigns and policed the waters, looking for suspicious vessels that 
could be harboring undocumented migrants. These efforts were influenced by European 
interests in securing the borders in order to protect European society and ensure its 
potential prosperity remains unfettered with the responsibility of supporting unwanted 
non-citizens. 
Now that the Canary Island route is closed off, West African migrants have turned 
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to the east and to the north, traveling east to Niger and north through southern Algeria 
and into southwestern Libya. This is the trans-Saharan route, a long and dangerous 
journey that can encompass two “seas” if Europe is the destination: the “sea” of the 
Sahara and the turbulent waters of the Mediterranean (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005). Since 
the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has been trying to extend Europe’s border with 
Africa southward by pressuring North African countries to tighten their border controls, 
stop irregular migration into and out of their member states and commit to bilateral anti-
migration agreements in exchange for aid (de Haas 2008). To put the force of this anti-
migration effort into perspective, in 2014, the IOM estimated of that 63% of the 
operational part of its 2015 budget (approximately $534 million on a total of $847 
million) would be supplied by the USA ($283 million), Canada ($30 million), Australia 
($56 million), EU member states ($97 million) and the EU ($68 million) (IOM 2014). 
Under the influence and pressure of its influential donors, the IOM is policing the Sahara 
and shaping international efforts to govern this zone. The IOM has, through many 
bilateral agreements, devoted extensive resources and millions of Euros to police and 
enforce these new vertical borders of Europe that stretch into the Sahara (Andersson 
2014; Brachet 2011; Brachet 2015; Collyer 2010). The EU has funded an outsized 
portion of IOM activities for years and has supported the implementation of various 
projects and anti-migration programs throughout North and West Africa and migrants 
have felt the various European interests and designs within recent IOM actions against 
their movements: 
 
Everywhere here, Europe spends millions to stop the adventurers. They are afraid 
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that we all want to go to Europe and now they are making it difficult for us. We 
are always told that we want to go to France, to Italy. The (local) police just say 
this to take money from us. Sometimes you are obliged to say that you want to go 
to Europe, even if that’s not true, but that’s what they want to hear.” - Malian, 
Faya-Largeau (Brachet 2015). 
 
Counter-Migrancy Tactics 
Recent campaigns to discourage this migration use language embedded in western 
perspectives of health, specifically public health, including 'suicidal risk', 'fatal', 'dangers', 
'atrocities', and 'nightmares' hoping to appeal to a presumed universal sense of fear 
(Brachet 2015). This rationale is assumed by African NGOs operating in certain Sub-
Saharan and Sahelian locales, with posters adorning buildings and transit hubs detailing 
the risky prospect of crossing the Sahara and how death is inevitable (Andersson 2014). It 
is trying to dissuade Sub-Saharan migrants from attempting to cross the desert, 
incorrectly assuming that all Black Africans going to North Africa intend to illegally 
enter Europe (Andersson 2015; Lucht 2011). Europe is not always the destination. A 
number of school age migrants remain in North African cities such as Tunis or Cairo for 
more than a decade, having abandoned the idea of continuing their route northward. 
Others plan to gain legal residency after having obtained a university diploma from a 
prestigious university (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005). Considering the case of North African 
migration, Michael Collyer and Hein de Haas challenge the common perceptions of 
North Africa as a transit zone or a ‘waiting room’ for migrants waiting to cross to Europe, 
as they speculate that there may be more sub-Saharan Africans living in North Africa 
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than in Europe (Collyer and de Haas 2012). Increasing trans-Saharan migration and 
settlement of migrants has played a key role in revitalizing ancient trans-Saharan 
(caravan) trade routes and desert (oasis) towns in Mali (Gao), Niger (Agadez), Chad 
(Abéché), Libya (Sebha and Kufra), Algeria (Tamanrasset and Adrar) and Mauritania 
(Nouadhibou) (Bensaâd, 2003; Boubakri, 2004; Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005; Spiga, 2005). 
According to Sylvie Bredeloup and Olivier Pliez, 2000 estimates, relayed by Saharan 
press, put the presence of African migrants in the region at 1-4 million, within a space of 
6 million total inhabitants (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005). The extensive migration industry 
and the vast monies that emanate from it have fueled the rapid population and economic 
growth of Saharan towns such as Agadez, Dirkou and Tamanrasset (Osili 2012 in 
Berriane and de Haas 2012). On their way, migrants often settle temporarily in towns 
located on migration hubs to work and save enough money for their onward journeys, 
usually in large trucks or pick-ups and some of this temporary staying has contributed to 
the growth of such Saharan towns (Barros et al. 2002; Brachet 2005; Collyer 2005; 
Escoffier 2006). In addition to this revitalization of Saharan communities, most major 
North African cities, including Rabat, Oran, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and Cairo, 
harbor sizeable communities of sub-Saharan migrants as a result of their voluntary and 
involuntary settlement (Boubakri, 2004, 4; Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005, 11–12). With 
some migrants remaining in North Africa, achieving a foothold in local economies and 
establishing livelihoods in towns of the Maghreb, they demonstrate the difficulty of using 
the term “transit migration” to characterize the experience and process of going through 
the Sahara to Europe while stopping in North Africa or the Saharan towns. Despite these 
efforts, migrants are still making the journey to Libya, via the long, difficult trek through 
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the unforgiving sands of the Sahara. It is the process of migration that constructs these 
Saharatowns as a spatio-temporal site of compression, a place of waiting and wanting. 
Understanding the desert and its Saharatowns is crucial to the analysis of its 
compression of black African migrants. The increasing urbanization of Saharatowns is 
expected, as these towns are the only ones in the desert with the infrastructure and 
capacity to absorb the thousands of migrants moving into and through them, as well as 
the vast amount of monies pouring in from the illegal migration industry. This industry is 
a dynamic system of interwoven ambitions and ostensible diametrically opposed goals 
that actually work symbiotically to make both anti-(illegal)migration security authorities 
and migrant traffickers tons of money. According to Ruben Andersson in Illegality, Inc., 
the term illegality industry “simply highlights how the ‘management’ of irregular 
migration is a particularly expensive—and lucrative—field within the larger migration 
industry” (Andersson 2014, 14). The instantiation of drones in African airspace, use of 
anti-migration surveillance networks across international boundaries, deployment of 
multi-billion dollar investments in new technologies, increased security forces to track 
migrants across land and sea, and extremely lucrative bilateral agreements all promote 
the illegality industry; the broader migration industry includes all the political machinery 
deciding migration policies and the extensive secondary (i.e. domestic) labor markets that 
undergird European society. Much more emphasis has been placed upon tracking the 
movement of migrants across the desert, with journalistic coverage focusing on 
smugglers, deaths on the trans-Saharan roads and migrants drowning at sea.  
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Non-Governmental Organizing of Trans-Saharan Migration 
She told me that the Cinema Caravan would take place tonight at Rimbo on rive 
droite (Harobanda) and that I could meet her at the International Organization for 
Migration main office at 21h30 so we could go there together. This was a relief because I 
doubted I could get to the rive droite bus depot without some help, as I was new in-town. 
Not knowing what to expect when Linda and I arrived at Rimbo, I sidled off to the far 
wall. There I had a nice vantage point from which to see both the projector screen and the 
entrance through which interested people would enter or stand at to curiously peer inside. 
As people trickled into the large lot inside the depot walls, attracted by the 
familiar Naija beats awakening the otherwise sleepy, dull Monday night on rive droite, 
Linda turned to me to resume her questioning of me. “What do you want to know about 
IOM?” she asked. Perhaps seeing my nonchalant response about being interested in IOM 
programming as a bit vague, Linda enthusiastically launched into an IOM advertisement, 
touting all the goals, objectives and programs of the organization. This is unsurprising 
coming from an IOM communications official, and I was prepared to have to sift through 
the deluge of development-speak to find interesting information. During our talk, she 
would often say that all this information can be found on the organization website, but 
still offer all the information relevant to my IOM interest and then some. The buzz 
surrounding this event began to intensify and I could feel that this show would get started 
soon. Sensing that the opportune time to interview Linda was waning, I pressed her about 
the actual IOM programs. She promptly listed them in detail, almost verbatim for the 
website. According to its standard operating procedure, IOM only works with pre-
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migrants, migrants, and internally displaced persons. It provides numerous services for 
these groups, including: 
• Crisis kits which include food 
• Transit center in Agadez: provides food, a place to stay and some toiletries 
• Voluntary Repatriation: IOM flies and buses people back to their countries of 
origin, and provides some brief skills capacitation talks, so that repatriating 
migrants can return home with some useful skills 
She went on to state that the sensitization work in Niamey and Agadez was important 
because it is preventive work that seeks to prevent or dissuade people from embarking 
upon migration journeys at all. Linda manages the cinema caravan program. She told me 
that IOM work in Niamey and in Agadez is critical to addressing the migrant situation in 
the country and this sensitization work (via the Cinema Caravan) is preventative because 
it seeks to dissuade (read: prevent) potential migrants from engaging in international 
migration at all. With all this IOM information and IOM/development-speak, I couldn’t 
help but find all this illusory. IOM is a large, internationally supported and incredibly 
well funded organization that does a lot of humanitarian and crisis work, but its 
programming is hardly preventative, despite what Linda says. IOM is not in the business 
of addressing the structural and global forces that lead people to seek better economic 
futures and improved realities elsewhere; it spends ample energy influencing actual 
movement of peoples rather than focusing on intervening in the lives of migrants who 
have already left their homelands and are in cities in towns along the long desert route. 
 
“We can’t stop you, but we can inform you.” – Linda 
 15 
 
Linda spoke with enthusiasm about a three-day program in Agadez. She said it 
took months to prepare and coordinate and she was up there for seven days, doing mainly 
pre- and post-program work, without water. I got the heavy impression she stressed this 
to ensure I understood the conditions for people living there. IOM worked closely with 
the local community to perform integration efforts in support of the event. This project 
was no different. IOM collaborated with the Aïr Sultanate (the local regional authority), 
the local community, and the “ghetto chiefs” to conduct the three-day project that 
coincided with a local festival in Agadez. Linda led me to believe these ghetto chiefs are 
smugglers who control the migrant ghettos and facilitate both entry into and egress from 
these enclaves. 
The three-day program had an educational session, a cinema caravan (like in 
Niamey) and a football match, which pitted Agadez youth vs. international migrants. The 
ghetto chiefs allowed IOM into the ghettos to talk to the migrants and inform them of 
their rights and services they can receive. 
At first, the officials as well as the ghetto chiefs were apprehensive about IOM 
activity within their domain. She demurred for a moment, then, to break the tension, I 
said the hesitation on the part of the Agadez officials might be due to the idea that 
everyone is getting some compensation for facilitating the migration industry through 
Agadez. She agreed. When I asked how IOM handled the conversations and 
arrangements that allowed it to enter into the ghettos, she said it was quite easy. After 
assuring the ghetto chiefs that it will not stop migration through Agadez, IOM entered the 
ghettos to prepare for the project. It assured local powers that it was only in Agadez to 
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teach migrants about the perils of migration, as well as inform and educate migrants 
about their rights and their options. All this fit well within the scope of the standard 
operating procedures of the organization. 
This relatively indirect approach to dealing with trans-Saharan migration evokes 
images of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and its issues with neutrality. When faced 
with contradictions in certain settings, MSF proved incredibly nimble in adapting its 
principles to remain morally good, to remain in the position to practice témoinage 
(witnessing). Peter Redfield notes that both neutrality and even témoinage might serve 
strategic ends, driven by a moral effort to raise awareness and stir collective action 
amongst other actors. He further states that the effectiveness of principles of neutrality or 
impartiality depend on the perceptions of the actors involved (Redfield 2013). In the case 
of Linda, IOM and Agadez, the crucial actors are the IOM officials who believe they are 
doing good, the migrants who IOM claims to serve, and the ghetto bosses who allow 
IOM entry into the Agadez ghettos. 
By limiting its operational scope to passing out crisis kits and facilitating 
voluntary repatriation, and simultaneously refusing to advocate for fair employment of 
migrants in Niger, does IOM protect its claims of neutrality? Beyond ensuring that IOM 
does not antagonize the many players in this Saharatown scene, including the local 
political officials, the ghetto bosses, and the many middlemen of the migration network 
running through Agadez, does this neutrality offer IOM anything else, anything more? 
Redfield adds that neither the position of public silence for organizational access to those 
in crisis, nor a more aggressive, less compromising set of principles incorporating 
independence, public speech and intolerance of rights abuses, guarantees universal access 
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in achieving humanitarian goals (Redfield 2013). So what effects does this IOM inaction 
have on the opportunities of migrants in Saharatowns like Agadez? Extensive, thorough 
ethnographic research can help respond to these concerns and questions. 
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IGNORED, ATTACKED AND COMPRESSED 
Discursive Effects of the Saharatown on Black African Migrants 
Certain situations and circumstances in life can be a vise-like grip, squeezing and 
holding one in a fixed position, which ultimately forces her own breath to escape her. 
Saharatowns are the embodiment of that vise. Economic and social conditions comprise 
to make these spaces particularly difficult for black African migrants. The idea of the 
transit town is not new, however, the Saharatown as transit town is important to examine, 
because it is growing from concentrated labor (e.g. infrastructural construction and 
economic growth) of the migrants who stay there and work, much like the growth of the 
U.S. from the institution of plantation slavery (Genovese 2014). In other words, suffering 
fuels economic growth.  
Arab-Bédouins controlling the Saharatowns through which black African 
migrants pass is an interesting circumstance because of the spatial-temporal dimensions 
of this phenomenon. Unlike the compressed black migrants elsewhere who also engage in 
long, arduous journeys, these migrants may remain in intermediate stages of the 
migratory journey for long stretches of time, ironically engaging in many exploitative, 
and racially discriminated jobs/activities similar to the ones to which they may be 
exposed at their intended destinations. Migrants in other migratory networks may not stay 
long enough in such intermediate areas to work, however in Saharatowns, the growth of 
the towns depends on this labor, this undocumented black labor. Because of this, the 
Saharatowns appear to extract economic benefit via exploitation and labor value 
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extraction from migrants in much the same way as the northern or Western economies to 
which many migrants would like to emigrate. 
Racial dynamics and economic realities of the landscape collide when the 
migrants inhabit and cohabit with Arab-Bédouins in the Saharatown. This relationship 
forms part of the equation that manifests the specific Saharatown compression that 
migrants may feel. Compression can describe black life and black migrant experiences 
everywhere throughout the globe However, Saharatown compression specifically targets 
black African migrants in two critical ways: 1) race and its attendant interactions with 
social mechanisms and activities that, together, compress life and social worlds and 
possibility for black Africans, and 2) inability to leave (being trapped) while working to 
do so and failing. The pressure of having one’s dream crushed, deferred, when the 
Saharatown was supposed to be an opportunity to make some quick cash, gear up, 
regroup and continue on, but it is a trap. Ironically, the desert has been framed as a 
landscape of passage and movement for many peoples, and understandably so. Some 
black migrants have characterized the journey through the Sahara as an “adventure” 
(Andersson 2014; Bredeloup 2008; Whitehouse 2007), a quest for dignity and modernity 
(Whitehouse 2013) and un rite de passage (Van Gennep 1981) but many see it as a 
necessary trip to ensuring economic opportunity and ultimately survival (Daniel 2008; 
Dougnon 2013; Kohl 2013; Lucht 2011). However it is the landscape of the Saharatown 
that also dictates passage. Because the Saharatown does not represent the end goal for 
most migrants, the failure of not being able to leave (Saharatown), coupled with the fact 
that one could not reach her true intended destination (i.e. North African metropolises on 
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the Mediterranean coastline, or Europe) comprise a “double failure”. This is the 
significance of Saharatown compression. 
 
The “Before,” “After” and “Over There” of Anti-Black Compression 
In Octavia Butler’s Kindred, a 26-year-old black woman, Dana, is ripped from her 
comfortable modern life and transported back in time to the slave quarters of the 
antebellum South. She is repeatedly brought back to the slave quarters and each time she 
stays in that time and space, the stay grows longer and more dangerous until she can no 
longer determine if she will live or die in that time and place (Butler 1979). Ultimately, 
she is caught between the problem of having moved and still not reaching one’s 
destination (in her case, beginning her life). This intermediate space is, in fact, a space or 
place that demonstrates this double failure. She is a black woman on a Maryland slave 
plantation in the mid 19th century, and unable to continue her young life in 1976. The 
spatio-temporal features of this apocalyptic, bleak fantasy epic differ markedly from the 
Saharan stories I am telling, but the dystopian present of a double bind of getting trapped 
and failing to reach the North that migrants face in Saharatowns, is remarkably similar. In 
both instances, blackness and being stuck in a place that exerts both spatial and temporal 
pressure specifically against black peoples are at work. 
Within that smaller spatio-temporal “space,” she cannot leave the plantation to 
which she is constantly returning, or the continuum that routinely shuttles her back and 
forth between her 20th century life and the life of the slave on the plantation. Temporally, 
Dana is stuck in two temporal registers in which time ostensibly ceases to advance in a 
conventional, unilinear fashion, with the ghosts of slavery hauntingly interrupting her 
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present-time as she interrupts the past as well (Bhaba 1991; Trouillot 1995; Kincaid 
1996; Hartman 2002). Saidiya Hartman frames this haunting remembrance of slavery for 
African American tourists visiting Elmina Castle in Cape Coast, Ghana, a large slave 
castle through which many captured Africans passed on their way to the Atlantic and 
beyond, as a moment of mourning and possible closure (Hartman 2002). However, the 
multidimensional transportation of Butler’s protagonist does not provide closure, but 
demonstrates the power of compression, where one can live in a space that is somehow 
smaller than herself. If we think of opportunity as a product of both space and time, then 
Dana is without much opportunity. For her, time moves on as much as it moves between 
itself. In this understanding of opportunity, she cannot realize dreams of being a free 
woman because she is a slave, and she simultaneously struggles to realize her dreams in 
the 20th century present because she fearful of the impending shuttle back to slavery 
where her dreams of freedom will be deferred. She and her dreams take up less space in 
the world than before. 
 
Dreams on Layaway 
 Although passing through Saharatowns en route to North Africa and beyond is a 
new normal in African migration to North Africa and Europe, the threat of remaining in 
the Saharatown simultaneously makes even one’s presence in the desert oasis dangerous 
to the viability of that dream of elsewhere. Existential compression describes the forces 
of one’s social environment and place within a larger social structure squeezing and 
constricting the possibilities and opportunities available to that person, such that one’s 
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being, one’s essence, is no longer realized in the larger structure, save for the squeezed, 
compressed role ascribed to her.  
Because of the high financial costs of the migrant journey and especially being 
stuck in a Saharatown failing to make due, migrants often wait for their families back 
home to send them money. In Agadez, young Guinean Abdul patiently waits for his 
family to send money allowing him to continue his trip to Libya, a cost of about 300-500 
Euros. 
 
“J’appelle ma famille pour qu’elle m’aide. Mais pour l’instant, rien ne se passe. Je 
pense qu’ils vont m’envoyer un jour de l’argent, quand ils en auront. Mais tu sais, 
ils n’ont pas l’argent pour en même temps, nourrir les enfants et pour m’aider. On 
cherche du travail ici mais il n’y en a pas.” 
 
[I call my family so they can help me. But for right now, nothing is going. I think they 
will send me money one day, when they will have it. But you now, they don’t have 
money at the same time to feed the children and to help me. One looks for work but there 
is none here (my translation; Dufrane and Wavreille 2016)]. 
These black African migrants are slotted through global racialized schema to: 1) 
work in certain jobs befitting the predetermined status afford by one’s race; 2) live in 
substandard housing because one is black and most avenues to finding and securing 
adequate housing in Saharatowns are foreclosed; 3) fear inciting anti-black violence, 
which discourages migrants from going to work and engaging in conspicuous 
consumption. What distinguishes this phenomenon from conditions that impinge upon 
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black (im)migrants elsewhere is that the orientation of current Africa-Europe migration 
routes has made the Saharatowns essential to the Trans-Saharan migration system, and 
that, unlike many other contemporary migration routes, it is often necessary for many 
migrants to stop and work for months at a time in order to make enough money to 
continue. Migrants leave their home countries for many reasons. Rapid population 
growth, economic depression, internal conflicts, political instability, widespread poverty, 
deepening unemployment and scarce economic opportunity have characterized much of 
the migration from sub-Saharan African nations (Adepoju 2000) as well as changing 
security and immigration policies (Kassar and Dourgnon 2014), and climate change 
(Barrios et al. 2006).  The journey to Europe is very expensive costing many individuals 
hundreds of Euros. In 2003, the Moroccan researcher Mehdi Lahlou estimated that a boat 
crossing from Morocco to Spain cost from $200 for minors to $500 to $800 for 
Moroccans, and up to $800 to $1,200 for Francophone and Anglophone sub-Saharan 
Africans, respectively (Lahlou 2003). However, migrants need to make money to 
continue the very expensive journey, as well as to live within towns along the route. 
According to de Haas, in the process of crossing the Sahara to North Africa, migrants 
spend hundreds of dollars on bribes, smugglers, transportation, and daily necessities (de 
Haas 2006). Because the sums of money for the long journey are so high, migrants 
remain in Saharatowns toiling for long periods of time trying to make large sums of 
money; this condition distinguishes this migration system from others found throughout 
the world. 
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Holding onto Dreams of Elsewhere 
To have no money is one thing, but to be ready and able to engage in wage labor 
without the possibility of gainful employment in Saharatowns exemplifies another aspect 
of compression: failure. Migration can be a modality of aspiration, a quest for “the good 
life,” and ultimately, hope (Chua 2014). When the prospect of work is foreclosed for 
many and living in town is a constant ordeal for most, aspirations may waver as hope 
fades. Money is what migrants need, and being without in the Saharatown is perilous for 
aspirations of actually leaving that place. Migration can also symbolize a failure to realize 
aspirational dreams. Some migrants, who find their new living situations untenable, 
return home experiencing a failed migration, characterized by interrupted dreams and 
massive loss (Chua 2014). The predicament of the undocumented migrant in Saharatown 
requires an expansion of the idea of failed migration to include the stagnation and stuck-
ness endured in Saharatown living. Being in the Saharatown is not the goal for many 
migrants, however it is part and parcel of reaching North Africa, a goal for most. Being 
unable to continue the journey due to lack of funds and returning home for fear of shame, 
embarrassment or admitting the journey was a failure are all types of failed migration. 
This failure, conditioned on the process (or lack thereof) of the journey, represents the 
dynamic jaw of the vise of existential compression. It forces people into situations of 
yeoman’s work such that they can fulfill the promise they made to their families back 
home, and so they don’t have to return home as failures. Entangled in this pressure of 
failure is the, sometimes interminable, wait until all the necessary requirements for 
departure are met. This temporal aspect cannot be understated. Many migrants remain in 
Saharatowns and in rural North African towns for years and many of them, after having 
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invested much time, energy and money in making life in those places, give up their 
quests to go further northward. They prefer to stay rather than risk indignity and dishonor 
of going to jail, facing repatriation and returning home empty-handed (Bredeloup and 
Zongo 2005). 
In Renegade Dreams, Laurence Ralph supposes that the ordinary, mundane 
dreams of Eastwood, a black neighborhood in East Chicago struggling with gang 
violence, economic inopportunity and social and institutional disenfranchisement, are an 
act of defiance. The Eastwood residents’ dreams of wanting to transform the community 
into a beloved community, or wanting to leave ganglife to become a writer in order to 
write from injury, or learning to speak out against the perils of gangs in order to empower 
youth to avoid a dangerous lifestyle, or even hoping to enjoy the mundane activity of 
walking home after school without it representing the threat of danger and essence of 
survival, were in fact renegade dreams (Ralph 2014). Nothing much was expected of 
Eastwood or the people from it, and dreaming of something good out of an Eastwood, or 
of an activist life out of an injury, is antithetical to the immobilization these 
circumstances inscribe on black people. Ralph realized, “If injury immobilizes people, 
like that fatal bullet that fractures the spine, then dreams keep people moving in spite of 
paralysis.” I invoke Ralph and his wonderful reflection on the power of dreams here, to 
emphasize the power of the dream of reaching one’s destination, or the hope one has of 
crossing the fiery desert in order to embark upon a new life with improved economic 
opportunity. Is the renegade dream of leaving the strictures and compression of the 
Saharatown enough to keep people going, striving for beyond the desert? With thousands 
of migrants mortgaging their presents for unguaranteed futures, paying for traffickers and 
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handlers who make money off their backs, do the traffickers of migrants and the families 
of migrants and expect the travelers to make it to North Africa? Are the migrants’ dreams 
concurrent with those expectations, or are they renegades? 
Ultimately, it is these dreams and hopes, hopes of more prosperous futures, of 
greater opportunities (e.g. jobs, monies, dreams, material wealth, etc.) and a chance to 
live in the “land of plenty” that are at stake, and that diminish. When social life is 
restricted to exploitative labor (or even trying to find labor which is also difficult, as 
Abdul attests), housing (substandard living conditions) concerns, and personal security, 
all under extreme duress with little else, the environment is compressing the existence of 
the individual. 
 
Black Migrant Compressions Across Space and Time 
Striking similarities exist among contemporary black trans-Saharan migration and 
the Great Migration of black Americans escaping Jim Crow South to other places in the 
U.S. during the time period of 1950 to 1970. During the mass exodus out of the Jim Crow 
South, newly mobile blacks had to quickly learn how best to travel through the South to 
the areas of the country now open to them. They embarked upon trains to Northern cities, 
or drove themselves in personal automobiles, directly to their destinations, with many 
driving more than 1,000 miles in just a few days. Isabel Wilkerson documented various 
firsthand accounts of blacks emigrating from the American South to the North and the 
difficulties those pioneers faced on their paths. Wilkerson chronicles the exodus story of 
Robert Joseph Pershing Foster, who in April of 1953 left Monroe, Louisiana, where 
hundreds of people and thousands more from the rest of the state joined the steady stream 
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of black folk moving to California. Setting off in his Buick Roadmaster, Foster began the 
2,000-mile journey to Oakland passing through East Texas where he stopped because of 
fatigue. He had a few drinks in a small Mexico town across the Rio Grande and the liquor 
was swimming in his veins. With more than half of Texas in front of him and 766 miles 
between Laredo, Texas and a small town of Lordsburg, New Mexico where some friends 
had promised him safe lodging, Mr. Foster needed a break. He knew, however, that he 
could not stop at the roadside motels on both sides of the highway to get a room, because 
“they didn’t take colored people, and it did no good to think about it. They might as well 
not have existed” (Wilkerson 2010). As Texas was still under the veil of Jim Crow, there 
was no safe place for lodging in Texas, the midway point of Mr. Foster’s journey. 
Recalling his trip, Mr. Foster said, “There were no hotels taking blacks then. No. None. 
So if you had a friend who would take you in, you went there, period, and you were 
through. And then you worried about the next stop.” 
Existence has been impinged and compressed such that the social connections 
between human and human and human to environment, leisure, relationships and action 
through entitlements (acting with confidence because one is a citizen and enjoys certain 
inalienable rights due to assumed citizenship; e.g. housing, healthcare, etc.) are 
compressed such that they are no longer viable within the social milieu in which the 
compression occurs (i.e. Saharatown). They are compressed to only focus on labor to 
acquire enough monies to continue the journey through the desert (a compression 
emanating from being stuck in the Saharatown), but must endure being paid much less 
for their work or even have their pay entirely withheld from them; they are constrained to 
labor and oftentimes actually live on their jobsite. 
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The influx of Black migrants into the Sahara has sparked racial tensions between 
Blacks and White North Africans, with numerous attacks by Arab-Bédouins against 
Black migrants occurring throughout Algeria. In June after the Euro 2016 football 
championship, 60 Black migrants were injured after an attack by Algerian youth in 
Tamanrasset (Berkani 2016); they were targeted for no reason other than they were 
foreign and Black. In another incident in March 2016, “des migrants subsahariens” 
sustained injuries from a large attack by the inhabitants of Béchar, a town about 1,000km 
south of Algiers. A few days before the attack, dozens of indigenous residents threw 
stones at the visible migrant lodgings within an abandoned market (the migrants live 
there), accusing the migrants of raping a young girl. Without filing a complaint with the 
local authorities, the indigenous inhabitants took control, attacking the “subsahariens”. So 
quickly can the ground beneath poor blacks and black migrants crumble and without 
warning, that life can be lived through this condition of precarity (Das and Randeria 
2015). The terms “subsaharien” and “subsahariens” are euphemistic codes for “black” 
migrants, and such metonyms mouthed by Bédouins highlight the differentials marked by 
geography, melanin and socioeconomic class. Notable in this account is the conspicuous 
passivity of the police present during the large assault against the migrants. A migrant at 
the scene said, “La police était sur place, mais pendant plusieurs heures, elle n’est pas 
intervue” or, “the police where there, but for several hours, they didn’t intervene” (my 
translation). This attack came on the heels of anti-migrant violence in the southern 
Algerian city of Ouergla where Algerians had learned that a Nigérien had stabbed an 
Algerian (Les Observateurs de France24 2016a). Residents refused to stand down and 
went to the construction sites where migrants reside in an informal settlement. After a 
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day of clashes, the authorities expelled migrants from the town, forcing them to go 
elsewhere. To be clear, migrants are attacked, and the police force the migrants to leave. 
No, this egregious tale is not an example of unique or even unfamiliar events in the 
context of the global phenomenon of migration. It is however, indicative of migrants’ 
need to work in a place that is not their intended destination. People can propel 
themselves toward their dreams or take up more space that is bigger than themselves, 
however their launching pad is shaky, fragile even. Compression describes the slow, 
violent pressure against those dreams, forcing one to exist within a smaller space, and 
blacks within this could still experience precarity as they try to take advantage of what 
hope remains. Why would people go through this space, which is not the Algiers, the 
Tripoli, the Lampedusa, or the Paris they may seek? Did they leave their homes of 
unacceptable economic and/or social conditions just to be underpaid and discriminated 
against in some faraway rural town? The fear of failure coupled with the many years 
migrants often spend in the desert working, persisting and waiting, exposes them to 
systemic violence and discrimination over the course of years. The dynamic jaw of the 
vise is tightening, pinning the migrant against the static one, and this is a demonstration 
of compression at work. 
The segregation of Jews in the middle ages was an effort by Christian Italians to 
ensure Christian purity within Italy, whereas the 20th century segregation of blacks in 
America was made to ensure white purity (Duneier 2016). The spatial and economic 
segregation in the Saharatown and its ghettos shares continuities with the situations of 
American blacks in the 20th century as well as the 21st century. In post-Reconstruction 
America, this segregation was demarcated by the color-line. W.E.B. Du Bois pointed to 
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the physical dwelling of blacks in Southern white towns when he stated, “A Negro slum 
may be in dangerous proximity to a white residence quarter,” (Du Bois 1903).  Drake and 
Cayton talk about how racial segregation gave rise to the black ghetto, specifically noting 
how black poverty in Chicago was exacerbated by the shortage of adequate, sanitary 
housing, leading to overcrowding, and the compounding of unhealthy living conditions 
(Drake and Cayton 1945). Rural to urban migration flows described much of the 
movement of American blacks out of the South to the North during the Great Migration, 
and many black African trans-Saharan travelers have left both rural and urban locales in 
their homelands in order to make life in the metropolises of North Africa. Migrating from 
capital cities in West or Central Africa to find opportunity in urban Mediterranean coastal 
towns is emblematic of structural inequalities of economic opportunity facing many 
increasingly urbanized African countries; where are the jobs within these cities and are 
there jobs for everyone (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004; Cobbinah and Erdiaw-Kwasie 
2016; Potts 2006; Watson 2014)? 
Many elements of the Béchar episode reflect Drake and Cayton’s analysis of 
black ghetto housing conditions in 20th century Chicago, including the living “quarters” 
of the migrants in the town. In Saharatowns, migrants do not enjoy adequate living or 
working conditions, often making a space to sleep at the jobsite. In many cities, migrants 
live in old, abandoned construction sites, or “des chantiers de construction” that are 
rigged to make tenement housing, with many individuals to a small room (Les 
Observateurs de France24 2016b). These are often found at the outskirts of town. Other 
common migrant settlement locations are within abandoned commercial markets, often 
found within town. Because local residents previously abandoned these spaces, everyone 
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knows where the new migrants live and congregate, as these are the only available spaces 
left for them to occupy. Therefore, it is not difficult to find them should people feel the 
urge. Residents allow these migrants to live within their midst, in squalid conditions as 
long as there is no disruption of the racial-moral order. Because of this racialized slum 
life, the residentially marginalized spaces for black migrants in Béchar had taken on the 
characteristics of a colony (Duneier 2016). 
Salif, a 17-year-old migrant from Mali, guided a Belgian journalist through a tour 
of his Agadez ghetto and the difficult conditions of living there, saying "Vous pouvez 
entrer et venir voir où nous dormons... Regardez, plus de 50-60 personnes dorment ici. 
C’est notre chambre, on dort à même le sol, on n’a pas de lit" or “You can enter and 
come look at where we sleep…Look, more than 50-60 people sleep here. This is our 
room, we even sleep on the ground, we don’t have a bed” (my translation; Dufrane and 
Wavreille 2016). Algerians tolerate these migrants due to the fact that they bring money 
to and labor in these modest towns. The influx of black migrants also signifies a value-
shift within the local town-economy. The migrant economy extracts thousands of Euros 
from migrants and the aggregation of migrants in towns where they are merely “passing 
through” means that monies will keep coming in via new influxes of migrants (and their 
labor). Most of the migrants work in these towns in the construction sector, primarily 
working on construction sites. Many of these construction sites are owned and controlled 
by national companies or are within the holdings of private corporations. Unfortunately, 
the benefit of tolerance comes with some strings attached. Often, attacks against black 
migrants followed a singular transgression committed by a migrant to which residents 
took umbrage. Again, blacks must live and labor very carefully; any mistake by one 
 32 
could be deadly for all. In these towns, the crime of one outsider authorizes violence 
towards all outsiders; the full weight of anti-migrant aggression is borne by all migrants 
living and working in proximity to each other due to the illegal behavior of one migrant. 
 
Compression: Living and Working in a Small Box 
Future ethnographic study of migrant-employment and their migrant-life in 
Saharatowns may provide data that demonstrate the importance of earning a lot of 
income and quickly, to both carry on with the journey and to continue living at the many 
nodes along the way. Throughout the Sahara, work arrangements to which migrants are 
subjected are uneven, and unequal and ultimately hierarchical. Working in Nouadihibou, 
Mauritania, Armelle Choplin documented how labor is organized within the key sectors 
that attract the largest number of foreigners (fishing, transportation and construction): “a 
Mauritanian contractor—frequently a Moor—dominates the sector and is backed up by 
local or foreign intermediaries (mostly Negro Mauritanians or Senegalese from the 
Senegal valley) who offer insecure and badly paid jobs to recently arrived migrants. The 
migrants are thereby made to fit into a society that is already strongly hierarchical and 
dominated by white Moors (bīdān), where they find themselves at the bottom of the pile, 
competing for jobs with Haratin  (black Moors, descendants of former slaves)” (Choplin 
2012, 170). In Agadez and Tamanrasset, the labor structures appear to be quite similar, 
with Bédouin and French contractors controlling business operations and employee pay, 
along with West African migrant intermediaries providing access to badly paid work and 
inadequate lodging to newly arrived migrants2. According to the Algerian League for 
Human Rights (la ligue Algérienne pour la défense des droits des l’Homme), migrant 
                                                            
2 Issa Younoussi in discussion with the author, May 2016. 
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construction workers are paid two times les than Algerian workers and are often the 
victim of blackmail by their Algerian employers; the employers threaten to report 
migrants to the local authorities when migrants question their working conditions (Les 
Observateurs de France 24 2016b). Saharatowns, since their inception, continue to thrive 
on agriculture and profits from raw material extraction, including uranium, gold, among 
other minerals. In recent years, they have been host to various opportunists seeking to 
take advantage of the globalized inequalities from which some people suffer. Makhulu, 
Buggenhagen and Jackson state that one opportunist risks her life to reach Europe in 
search of a better life, and the other focuses on the passage of the first, preferring to make 
a living through human trafficking. They accurately surmise that these opportunists are 
responding to the “vagaries of the world system” (Makhulu, Buggenhagen and Jackson 
2010). Euro-American modernity has outpaced the tepid growth of these desert oases and 
has effectively excluded many of the people passing through them. Are these 
opportunists, these laborers, engaging in “productive activity” leading to a realization of 
entering or achievement of a modernity? In this sense, modernity or a modernity is the 
final or intended destination many migrants seek. Modernity is also a phenomenon of the 
mind, more than a place in which it is merely located. Is the person who is stuck in the 
desert oasis producing as well?  
In their publication, “Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is Evolving 
Toward Africa,” the Comaroffs contend that a dominant Modernity exists, yet the global 
South, especially Africa, represents the position from which new, more critical insights of 
the world emerge (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). I am not implying that migrants are 
consciously trying to enact some new modernity or world order. What I am suggesting is 
 34 
through modernity-making migration, people are looking for better work and better work 
conditions, but also opportunity and purchase of new, uncharted futures. Black Africans 
on the move are also looking for new ways to be in the world, to make money and to 
make life outside of their destitute circumstances at home. Whatever the dominant 
Modernity is, it has proven to be categorically unfair to many Africans. The Comaroffs 
focused on the South African context, however this offers a reframing of this 
contemporary Saharan example as a template for what possible futures lay on the horizon 
for places beyond the Sahara, including Euro-America. The figure of the migrant is the 
liquid that spills out of the categories of neoliberal capitalism, and the migrant, in being a 
moving being, actually articulates the contours of subjectivities of alternative modernities, 
of alternative worlds. What many migrants are doing is trying to find employment to 
carve out a living in the very world that seeks to subjugate and exploit them. Like 
migration, modernity-making is a process, and for those biding their time in the Sahara 
until they can continue on to elsewhere, that process will remain incomplete, the quest 
unfulfilled. Perhaps the aforementioned opportunists are also engaging in such a process. 
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MAKING OF SAHARATOWNS 
 
Saharatown Dynamics 
The process of urbanization of the Sahara inaugurated the emergence of 
Saharatowns, and unfolded over the course of the 20th century under the newly 
independent Maghrebi states initiating and managing this growth. According to Olivier 
Pliez and Armelle Choplin, Saharatowns are a composition of two contrasting urban 
models that correspond to very different temporalities: on the one hand, the Saharan city, 
born of the transnational capitalist exchange networks, that has been part of the trans-
Saharan caravan trade for centuries; on the other hand, the city in the Sahara that is the 
progeny of the young postcolonial states who sought in the 1960-80s to consolidate their 
national territory by setting up cities on their Saharan frontiers (Choplin 2014; Pliez). 
Based on these two special conceptions, Pliez disarticulates the socio-spatial dynamics 
that have disrupted the Sahara since the 1990s. This pivotal period represents a re-
equilibration between high (the State) and low (local society), and between logics of 
physical territory (territory of the state) and territory of network (trade and migratory 
flows). In order to understand the evolution of the past two decades, Pliez enumerates 
three major developments: the appropriation of these towns by their inhabitants (“return 
to the local”) from the State; the transformations of urban spaces by the migrants who 
traverse the Sahara to work farther north, and; the intense and systematic connection of 
the Sahara to the rest of the world, via the various networks of globalized transnational 
trade. These different dynamics offer a view of the Sahara undergoing a reconfiguration, 
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divided between various territories – those of the State and those of economic and 
migratory circulations – all in which the city, the Saharatown, is where these dynamics 
manifest. 
In voluntarily implementing development plans in the desert, these newly 
independent states sought to mark their spatial boundaries, fix their populations and 
spread the infrastructural elements of the larger, urban towns of the Mediterranean coast 
(e.g. highways, airports, tertiary hospitals, commercial buildings, etc.) to the ends of the 
rural zone. In the 1990s, the states of the Maghreb largely withdrew from the Sahara and 
reduced their levels of development in that zone. These nations engaged in 
decentralization of their governance of sectors within their economies, while promoting a 
phase of the “return to the local,” in which more economic determination was granted to 
local communities, such as southern Algerian towns Tamanrasset and Djanet, the 
southern Libyan towns Ghat and Al Qatrun, and the northern Nigérien cities Agadez and 
Dirkou. This decentralization of the state to the localities, including the extremities of the 
nation posed a challenge to the emergence of local actors in diverse sectors of economic 
activity. How would the rural, southern communes of the Maghrebi states create 
economic opportunity from tourism, mineral extraction, etc., without much help from the 
state? In order for these rural towns to become viable, self-sufficient communities, they 
decided to urbanize, leveraging their natural resources (e.g. land, agriculture, access to 
water, etc.) with their urban and population growth to serve as the means of production. 
This mirroring of the coastal towns of the north, allowed these desert towns to remain 
stable and economically productive, providing some autonomy from the capital. 
 37 
There are two ways to read the decolonized Sahara: cities within the Sahara and 
the desert itself, can be viewed within the prism of a return to the local; the other reading 
is that this localization of Saharan cities will inaugurate a further distancing of 
themselves from the urban cores of their nations, making it rather easy to consider them 
comprising the margins of the state. The centralized State is able to maintain control over 
the Saharatowns with minimal consideration and effort, unlike the larger towns near the 
capital that may require strict control due to their political and economic clout. Renewed 
development of the Sahara has allowed for the erasing of the temporalities and the 
specificities of the rural Saharan cities that separated them as socially and economically 
different from the rest of the State. This process invited the Saharatowns into the fold of 
the State. By inaugurating redevelopment projects and schemes within the Sahara, the 
State can view and control the Saharatowns through the same prism of sovereignty as the 
more densely populated and politically dominant regions near the coastal capitals. Before 
this recent development in the late 20th century, Saharatowns were left to virtual 
autonomy and obscurity with respect to rule of law, but national development projects in 
the region came on the heels of the State’s desire to capitalize on the raw materials and 
agricultural space needed to feed the urban cores of the coast. A strategic move meant to 
foster goodwill among the rural Saharan communities, the investments in the rural towns 
by the State served two goals: 1) satisfy the needs of the rural communities so that there 
will be little contestation against State extraction of local resources and disturbance of 
regional autonomy and 2) reorganizing the local workforce and regional infrastructure to 
facilitate and contribute to the extractive economies of intense agriculture reproduction, 
mineral and raw material extraction and land repurposing (Bisson 1996; Pliez 2011). It is 
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this tension, between centralization and local power of the rural community that aptly 
characterizes the condition and function of the Saharan city within the national context.  
 
People on the Move 
Migration is a practice that connects peoples and worlds, but simultaneously 
collapses them in the process. Not all migration stories are equally arduous, just as not all 
boast the same patterns of occupancy of modes of existence. However, many trans-
Saharan migrants demonstrate the profound experience of inhabiting and enacting life, 
compression and survival, more than once. The globalization of international markets and 
the increasing connectivity of capital flows have benefitted some nations and peoples 
whereas others have suffered. Niamey and Agadez, Niger are towns central to this long, 
overland migration route, and many migrants will continue on towards Tamanrasset, 
Algeria. Because of this pattern, I provide a brief image of these towns on this migratory 
circuit, which merit further ethnographic investigation. 
 
Niamey to Agadez, Pre-desert to Desert 
Niamey, a city of approximately 1.09 million people (Central Intelligence Agency 
2015) sits in the southwestern corner of the Republic of Niger on the Niger River, in the 
Sahel of West Africa. Niamey, the capital city of Niger is the last major town on this over 
land route before crossing into the Sahara desert en route to North Africa [see map 
detailing route and distances]. Niamey, a sleepy but cosmopolitan town of a poor, 
landlocked, resource-rich nation, has swelled in recent years at a rate between 4.22% and 
4.55% since 1990 (Habitat UN 2010), mostly attributed to rural Nigériens moving to the 
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city as well as some international migrants stopping there to gear up for the next 
migratory leg.  
During my first time in Niamey, I could not help but think of the cities in the 
desert afar. Niamey is not a Saharatown and is actually quite different, however, it is on 
the larger, West Africa to North Africa migration route (Figure 1).  
Niamey is not Saharan, but as I thought of the desert, I could feel the Sahara or 
my imagined taste of it, in the air. The Sahara traveled in the sandstorms against which I 
occasionally steeled myself with shirt and scarf. It beckoned from the words of folks with 
whom I met who knew Agadez in some way. That far-flung town has come to evoke the 
Sahara when uttered at all. In fact, Niamey and Agadez, through the migration flows 
between them, speak to each other as much as they do people. 
If Niamey signifies a “pre-Sahara” because it is just south of the desert and not 
actually in it, than it may also be a “pre-Saharatown” strictly in the sense that it is the last 
large town before crossing into the desert. In order for most migrants coming through 
Niger to reach North Africa, they must go through Niamey, then Agadez and beyond. 
Niamey is connected to the Saharatown of Agadez by more than a shoddy, intemperate 
road; because of its order in the migration circuit and its proximity, it holds a vision of 
Agadez within itself and is a staging ground for those looking to reach North Africa. How 
time in Niamey “prepares” individuals for life in Saharatowns such as Agadez and 
Tamanrasset is unknown. 
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Agadez and Tamanrasset 
The Sahara is a sparsely populated region with most of its 2.5 million inhabitants 
spread across about 3.3 million square miles of desert living near lakes and rivers (Peel 
and Gritzner 2015). In general, Saharatowns are home to anywhere from 5,000 to 20,000 
inhabitants, however there are a few that hold upwards of 120,000 residents, with many 
people situated outside of towns in the surrounding deserts but traveling to the towns to 
participate in commercial markets. Increasing trans-Saharan migration and migrant 
settlement have played a key role in revitalizing ancient trans-Saharan trade routes and 
desert (oasis) towns such as Agadez, Niger and Tamanrasset, Algeria (Bensaâd, 2003; 
Spiga, 2005). As of 2012, Agadez had a population of about 118,000 inhabitants, a 
marked increase from 1995 when it had a population of about 85,000 (Agadez.org 2004). 
Today, it is estimated to have a population of 140,000 (Hinshaw and Parkinson 2015). 
Residents are primarily local peoples, indigenous both to the Sahara and to the town.  
Some of the increase in size of Agadez is attributable to the influx of peoples 
from other parts of Niger, but most of the increase is due to the presence of international 
migrants (overwhelmingly from west and central African countries). Agadez, located in 
the center of northern Niger, sits at the foot of the Sahara desert and is the largest town in 
central Niger. An ancient, culturally dynamic city, Agadez is home to several ethnic 
groups that continue to shape the image of the town. Much of the economic activity 
within Agadez is related to local commerce, artisanal crafts (both crafting and selling) 
and agricultural production. The Tuareg, a seminomadic, socially stratified, Islamic 
people who live in parts of Mali, Algeria and Niger (Rasmussen 1998), are one of the 
dominant groups in the region. They occupy much of the Saharan routes through which 
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sub-Saharan migrants travel. For some Tuaregs, especially young men, the Sahara allows 
a document-less mobility, in which men, women and children can move freely between 
Niger, Mali, Libya and Algeria without passports or visas. With all the migrants coming 
into Agadez as part of the illegal migration industry, Agadez and the Tuareg have 
adopted new economic activities. Many Tuareg have been able to leverage their 
knowledge of the desert to serve as guides and help navigate smugglers through the 
desert, for a price (Bensaâd 2007; Serge 2008;). The Tuaregs are considered the 
protagonists of the migration route through the desert, often facilitating the transport of 
sub-Saharan migrants through Tuareg lands and often driving the trucks or “Hiluxes” that 
dart across the Sahara (Kohl 2015). Such fluid boundaries between trade, smuggling and 
migration, both enable movement and allow for the sustainability of expanded social 
connections as possibilities for these Tuaregs and other migrants in the Sahara (Kohl 
2007).  
Located in the Tamanrasset Province in southern Algeria, the oasis city of 
Tamanrasset is a town of more than 93,000 people nestled in a valley within the Ahaggar 
Mountains (Nadi 2007).  It is considered the capital of Tuareg (ethnic Berber) Algerians. 
This city serves as way-station for travellers coming from south of Algeria going to North 
Africa. Tamanrasset has a very diverse demographic, with various Tuareg peoples and 
Berbers from the north (referred to as “northerners”). Many of the city dwellers also 
come from the surrounding nations, including Hausa, Songhay, and Zarma peoples as 
well as Tamasheq and Hassaniya speakers (Badi 2012). Like Agadez, there are many 
West and Central Africans living in Tamanrasset as well, and like the northerners, they 
are quite socially different than the indigenous groups of the city. Tamanrasset has no 
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industry; its economy depends almost exclusively on tourism and trade. It has been able 
to profit from the migration economy dumping people there, by absorbing their cheap 
labor in construction, agriculture and mining work. Like Agadez, Tamanrasset is 
incredibly diverse and cosmopolitan, as many people have different uses for the city, and 
different temporalities within it. 
 
The Rise of the Saharatown 
These Saharatowns reflect a paradox, inasmuch as they are the consequence of 
recent urbanization and the result of a rupture in the temporalities that mark the desert as 
useful (because of arable land, mineral wealth and their de facto position as border 
towns) by the State. Up until recently, there has been little interest in developing these 
Saharatowns like the major coastal cities along the Mediterranean; that would divide 
power and render these locales more than simply borderlands cities. Politically, state 
leaders and their regimes have realized the power and utility of these lands, as they are 
closely connected to important products (i.e. agriculture and minerals), as well as 
welcoming and housing large populations of migrants from elsewhere. Governments 
have considered allocating resources to Saharatowns as an essential part of re-
equilibration of the national territories. In providing residents of Saharatowns critical 
resources to perform agriculture and to green the desert or “verdir le desert,” 
governments are paying peoples “gifts” so that extraction of minerals and agricultural 
products go unabated. Urbanization is key to all of this because it will allow the town to 
sustain these national investments and maximize its material contribution to the state. 
Jean Bisson stated that “l’urbanization soustend le dynamism agricole” or, urbanization 
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underlies agricultural dynamism (Bisson 1996). According to Olivier Pliez, the state 
pursued this idea by deploying a combination of several tactics, including encouraging 
the concentration of populations, creating or modernizing irrigation systems, opening of 
markets, allocation of primary education materials and making substantial improvements 
in local health infrastructures. For the authorities, these rural investments promote a 
balance between rural commune and the rest of the national territory and provide political 
justification for exploitation of desert lands for potential economic profit. This also fixes 
the populations such that they materialize and represent the limits of the national territory 
and protect the abundance of resources found within its Saharan borders (Pliez 2011, 45). 
This history of the formation of the Saharatown is necessary to highlight here. It provides 
some context for the current situation of these growing cities in relation to migrants and 
the cheap, highly exploitable labor those migrants perform. 
 
A Filmmaker, Rockstar and Development Worker Walk into a Bar… 
The taxi driver had no idea what I was saying or where exactly I wanted to go, 
because I had no idea where I was going. “Bobiel! Qarrefour Bobiel!” I kept saying. I 
offered 2,000 cfa (approx. 4.00 USD) and no doubt that was too much, but I didn’t have 
much bargaining power because I didn’t actually know where this place was. After about 
30 minutes the car stopped and I noticed a tall lanky white man with a slender looking 
Nigérien man Chris told me he would be with, and I assumed this was my party. I knew 
of the white man via Twitter. He’s a filmmaker, and I came all this way to finally get a 
copy of his film, Akounak Tedalat Taha Tazoughai in Tamasheq or “Rain the Color of 
Blue with a Little Red in It.” This is a Tuareg remake of the famous Prince film Purple 
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Rain set in Agadez, yet in Tamasheq, there is no translation for the word “purple,” thus 
the “Blue with a Little Red in It” portion of the film title. I tried to find this movie in 
North Carolina after missing a film screening of it in Maryland, but could not find a film 
screening or copy of the film anywhere near me. Luckily, Chris told me via Twitter that 
he would be in Niamey in May but our time there overlapped for barely an evening. This 
was my best shot to finally get this film but it was also a chance, during this preliminary 
research trip, to speak with a foreigner who has come to “know” Agadez. Since I am a 
foreigner as well, I wanted to gain a sense of what to expect in there. The film shows 
Agadez in motion, in action, an image I could not get from being in Niamey, of course. It 
depicts the struggles of a young Tuareg man negotiating the path his culture has placed in 
front of with his dreams of being a rock musician. It does not, however, capture the 
despair of a worker, migrant or otherwise, trying to scratch out a living in the sand. 
Sitting in a chair across from me and Moussa, with his languid posture and casual 
demeanor, Chris schooled me on Agadez, specifically about the things he thought a 
rookie like me should know. He didn’t balk when I mentioned that I want to go to 
Agadez. He has been to Agadez numerous times to record and produce various films he’s 
made as well as to work with Tuareg musicians as part of his cultural exploration of West 
Africa called Sahel Sounds. He said that Agadez “is crazy”. There are lots of drugs (he 
specifically said “cocaine”), weapons, etc.; everything seedy is there. I had previously 
heard this from others and read bits of this in bloating, superficial news reports, but 
hearing Chris ardently tell me about the illicit underbelly of Agadez evoked grimey, 
gritty images of the city; Agadez began to appear fast, tenuous and very complicated. The 
drug, weapons and human smuggling add an element of haste and quickness to the town 
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that I had yet to consider. All of this action must take place as an open secret, but with 
extreme speed and relative precision so that the delicate international chains stretching all 
the way into southern Europe is not irrevocably disrupted and no one gets caught. Chris 
went on. He said there are “lots of ghettos” and lots of “mafias,” the link in speech 
between the two supporting the assertion that the two realities coincide with one another, 
at least in Agadez. In such a rendering, Agadez mirrors how hipsters described 1990s-era 
Washington, DC (or pick your big U.S. city), waxing poetic about the violent crime, 
rampant drug use and overall poor conditions of the neighborhoods in which they resided. 
Hipsters embraced this edginess of the city, which demonstrated their bohemian world-
views and legitimated their street-cred; they were cool for liking and living in dangerous, 
black DC. Agadez is more than simply danger and illegality, yet that view was competing 
with this powerful and contradictory image of the “crazy” but “safe” Agadez. 
Continuing his presentation on Agadez, Chris stated that “The mafias are 
constantly fighting each other,” but “It’s okay to be a foreigner as long as you’re not 
involved in the mafia” activities. “It’s safe,” he said, but this was a weak gesture that was 
as convincing as me with blonde hair and blue eyes. Moussa seconded this take on 
Agadez. Moussa is a Tuareg guitarist who frontlines a popular Tuareg band, and has 
played throughout Europe and Africa. As a native of Agadez, Moussa’s opinion of the 
town and his support of Chris’s claims about it are very comforting to me, legitimate 
even, because I did not want to follow a foreigner’s ideas about Agadez if they differed 
from that of the locals. I found it ironic, however, that Moussa seconded almost all of 
Chris’s assertions, as if Chris was from Agadez as much as Moussa. I didn’t know much 
about people from Agadez, and the presence and qualities of Moussa crystallized this 
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cosmos of Agadez as well as the theories of its inhabitants. Moussa has traveled the 
world over and he has a professional relationship with Chris through their music and 
artistic interests, doing music production, going on tour and making video collaborations, 
surprised me. Looking at all this on the backdrop of serialized accounts of Agadez and its 
illicit migration infrastructure, one can see Agadez as kaleidoscopic and multi-layered, 
such that hardly one single rendering of Agadez prevails over its many other renditions. 
Despite an outsized amount of media attention depicting ostentatious and macabre 
“scenes” of the arduous trans-Saharan journey, many other realities and conditions have 
escaped the aperture of the journalists’ camera lens. Much of this focus is centered on 
migrants leaving from Agadez northward to Algeria and Libya, but what about the road 
to Agadez from Niamey? I framed many of my questions about Agadez from the position 
of not having yet been there, and Chris and Moussa addressed my questions from the 
vantage point of knowing Agadez well. “What’s the road like and how long does it take?” 
I asked. 
Chris launched into a story about his last few times going to Agadez. The bus 
usually leaves for Agadez at around 0400h. He’s taken a few different bus “agences” and 
has settled on Rimbo as his preferred bus agency. The road leaving Niamey is rather 
smooth for the first few hundred kilometers. The checkpoints are numerous but Chris said 
that even as a white, he hasn’t experienced any issues. A few hours into the journey, the 
bus stops so the many Muslims, often times including the bus driver and the petit 
chauffeur (a co-worker of the driver, often a young man, who opens the car door to shout 
out the vehicle’s destination to passersby who may want to board, and to collect fares 
from passengers; he is also responsible for loading and unloading the vehicle), may 
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perform their daily prayers in mosques in small villages along the way. After a few 
hundred kilometers, the road gets choppy and becomes less of a road and more of a path 
or “piste,” unsuitable for overland travel with 20-30 passengers crammed in a small bus. 
The bus travels much slower in order to traverse the broken road and brace against the 
whipping sand, all the while speeding to make time and hopefully escape would-be 
bandits. One time, the 950km trip was rather quick and Chris arrived after about 16 hours 
on the road, but he described his last trip as terrible, taking about 22 hours. 
After hearing about this arduous overland journey, I wondered aloud about a 
flight from Niamey to Agadez.  Chris wanted to know how I planned to make it to 
Agadez, but flinched at my ideas of going by plane. He said he trusts the overland route 
via bus more than a Nigérien plane and he feels safer in the bus; I thought this was 
remarkable. The strong reaction to the “Nigérien plane” caught me by surprise and I 
thought there might be some more subtext to that comment but I didn’t want to press him 
any further. Why did he prefer the overland route, which he said was terrible, over a 
flight? Perhaps the bus could offer a beautiful view of the approaching city that a plane 
may not; the bus hurtling towards an Agadez that begins to peak over the otherwise flat, 
sandy horizon is another important way of “experiencing” Agadez, even before arriving. 
However, he intimated to me that he did not “trust” the “Nigérien” plane, and I thought it 
had to do with the presumed capability of Nigériens (i.e. pilots, air control officials, etc.) 
to conduct a safe flight. Or did the many charges of corruption within this poor nation 
lead him to this skepticism? We both arrived in Niger via international flights to Niamey, 
so perhaps planes entering and departing from the capital are not the issue; flights to and 
from Agadez seem to be the issue. Such an underhanded disavowal of Nigérien faculties 
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by someone who displayed concern for how I might represent Agadez, Niger, a paradox 
that highlights the inherent contradictions of life and what is possible within Agadez. 
Moussa had his wife serve the three of us beans made with onions, tomatoes and 
spices, and we casually ate them with bread. Hungry from hardly eating and enduring the 
torrid heat, I was famished, and tried to eat my fill without putting my face in the bowl. 
Moussa on the other hand, appeared at ease, regal even, with Chris and I eating the fruits 
of his wife’s labor while enjoying the serenity of his compound. After having a bit of tea, 
which Moussa cleverly referred to as “Tuareg whiskey,” Chris ambled off to his bag to 
grab a USB stick containing the film; he was staying with Moussa that night in order to 
catch the 4am buss to Agadez in the morning. Excitedly clutching my laptop, I hurriedly 
copied the film to my hard drive and tucked my computer back into my pack. I finally get 
to see Agadez in motion. All of this, chilling with Moussa the Tuareg rock star and Chris 
the filmmaker and music producer, was incredibly cool, but was this an “Agadez” 
experience, even far away in the small suburb of Niamey? What then, or who rather, is a 
legitimate representative of Agadez, of a Saharatown? Perhaps the cool, international 
rock star legitimates an Agadez that does not exist for the migrants, ghetto bosses, mafia 
members and drug traffickers who comprise the seedy Agadez Chris embraced. Chris and 
Moussa are not typical folks one would expect to find in a remote location like Agadez. 
Not only are they musicians and filmmakers, they are removed from the dominant 
economic activities of the town and the region; namely agricultural production, 
construction, local trade and illicit migration. They do not work, and therefore probably 
do not live, in the same conditions as most other people in town. What is the significance 
of these particular men telling me about Agadez, in which they ostensibly occupy the 
 49 
cultural (i.e. upper) echelon of society? Were they recruiting me? Did they want me to go 
into Agadez (Chris referred to it as “Aga”) with good impressions through which I would 
see everything as rosy, romantic? The Saharatown must be defended, and Chris and 
Moussa were defending the reputation of Aga from my unwritten future work of the 
struggle of being in that place. They did not want me to be critical of Agadez, a place 
they both obviously hold dear. Such a defense of Agadez from the higher classes of 
society juxtaposed with the offering of Agadez being rife with crime is emblematic of a 
taste for alterity, a taste for the otherness of Agadez (Newell 2012b). What role does such 
affectation of disdain for Agadez while simultaneously fetishizing its negative traits 
precisely because it is perceived as dangerous, dirty, counter-culture, hip or Other (in 
other words, being a hipster), have for the people living at the lower rungs of the socio-
economic hierarchy? Do these bourgeois hipster folks care what happens to the black 
people comprising the city and its conditions they fetishize, or are they invested in this 
unequal social arrangement? 
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MAKING LEMONADE WHERE THERE ARE NO LEMONS 
 
Migrant Response to Compression 
Stuffed like sardines in an overcrowded, rickety truck, hurtling across the 
inscrutably vast, blank desert is not a place for robust sociality or extended social 
relations. In fact, this is the place were they are tested between all the people who are 
packed in the back and on the sides of such trucks. With scores being settled between 
nationalities once the truck moves in to Libyan no-man’s-land territory, sharing too much 
information about oneself or “misbehaving” may compromise one’s mission, whether 
that is to travel to Europe or make life in one of the large North African cities along the 
Mediterranean (Lucht 2011). In fact, much of trans-Saharan migration takes place in 
stages, with migrants moving to and through migration hubs along the way (de Haas 
2006), meaning that individuals may experience compression in such stages as well. In 
Darkness Before Daybreak, an ethnography of Ghanaian fisherman who traveled to Italy 
via the trans-Saharan route, Hans Lucht details harrowing tales of desertion in the desert. 
Deep in the sand dunes of northern Mali, a truck ferrying passengers to Libya lost its way, 
and the struggle to stay alive and on the truck is very difficult: 
 
“Sometimes the jeep got stuck in the sand, and we had to get down and push it; 
but if you don’t manage to get back in the car very fast, they would leave you. My 
brother was very weak at the time; he was sleeping in the car, so I told the 
ladies—we had six ladies in the car—to take care of him. But when the people 
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jumped back on the car, they stepped on him. Everybody was fighting to get 
inside the car. When the car was moving, I tried to separate the people [from the 
brother], but I could not. They were all weak; I could not. When we came to that 
last place to share the water, I called on him but no response.” – Michael (Lucht 
2011, 166). 
 
Michael and others facing desertion and demise in the desert experience the 
rupture of sociality and struggle to endure the spatio-temporal conditions. Reaching 
Libya would provide many people the opportunity to begin expanding their worlds again, 
but they also attempt to “expand” under duress during travel. Some stranded individuals 
may work together to find shelter somewhere and to look out for one another. Other times, 
individuals may bury those who have perished on the truck or while trudging through the 
Sahara on foot after having been stranded. Echoing’s Vogt’s work, these signify 
engagements of intimate labors (Vogt 2016), expansion of compressed existence to return 
to committing acts of a social life. Within compression, one lives in a space that is 
smaller than herself squeezing her to fit. Social connections become reconfigured around 
qualities of efficiency and utility. People are forced to eschew relations more about 
leisure and love in favor of more strategic, self-serving or dream-serving ones.  These 
engagements also demonstrate a refutation of not only the compression of migration, the 
Saharatown and the anti-black, anti-migrant elements of both, but also the global socio-
economic order that positions them, hierarchically, at the bottom. Opportunity and the 
extra space for socialities not constrained by compression, Saharatowns or migration 
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exist for some migrants in North African metropolises, in European urbanscapes or even 
back home. That is to say, they are found outside of compression and the Saharatown. 
The ghetto and ghettoized living in these Saharatowns represent an ordered space 
and call forth a constrained, limited living situation for migrants living in such terrible 
conditions. The presence of mafias, warring over the town and the squalid ghetto 
territories, demonstrate the dynamism of Agadez, of a Saharatown, refuting the notion 
that it is nothing more than a rural transit-town. Louisa Lombard posits that visibility and 
flexibility are ways that people enable projects of profit and networking, and respond to 
pervasive instability, respectively (Lombard 2012). Within these societies, permanent 
flexibility and shifting visibility enacted by the many peoples who inhabit, take 
advantage of, and remain subject to the Saharatown, are actually responses to the vise, to 
compression, inasmuch as these peoples make due and make it out of a situation that 
would no less crush them. Interesting and overlapping layers of society, licit, illicit and 
gray economies all comprise a dynamic system teetering on the fulcrum of migration, and 
this is indicative of a cosmopolitan, multi-dimensional world. 
 
Men’s Consumption and Women’s Absence 
Modernity and modernity-making for the black African migrant may resemble 
what Sasha Newell refers to as mimesis (Newell 2012). In the Sahara, migrants are not 
engaging in a consumerist mentality to reproduce ideas of an idyllic cosmopolitan urban 
subject; on the contrary, this cultural activity is incongruous to the social milieu that is 
the Saharatown. With no shopping malls, stores selling luxury goods or the like, this is 
hardly an easy consumerist environment. However, despite being relatively poor, very 
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rural, and boasting little access to commercial luxury goods, the Saharatown migrants 
may yet engage in conspicuous consumption, perhaps exclusive to their migrant 
connections. Newell notes that individual accumulation, the display of transitory wealth 
and the awareness of living a life where money is not an issue, could all serve to enhance 
one’s reputation and build stronger social ties. This is not necessarily the case for black 
migrants in Saharatowns.  
More ethnographic research could squarely support this argument. Could 
conspicuous material accumulation also attract the ire of local residents, especially when 
violence against migrants is common? Much of the existing literature highlighting 
migrants in Saharatowns generally offers brief note of migrants working to make some 
money in order to keep moving. During attacks by residents and raids from gendarmes, 
migrants lose some of their stuff, including money. Living in abandoned open-air markets 
or construction sites makes the possibility of collecting and showcases material wares 
quite difficult. The small Saharatown is not where one wants to show off; one does that in 
Tripoli, Algiers or Naples and Palermo if the person is lucky to reach across the 
Mediterranean.  
“Les jeunes du quartier nous volent, nous agressent, provoquent nos femmes,” 
said Dély Ibrahim, a Cameroonian living in the town Cars. The youth of the 
neighborhood accost blacks and provoke the black women as well.  Afraid of being a 
permanent victim of violence, he said “Les Blacks, ne sortent plus. On n’a pas travaillé 
depuis trois jours,” or “The blacks no longer go out; we haven’t worked for three days” 
(my translation; El Watan 2016). Violence against migrants is also violence against 
laborers who are responsible for building the new growth of the city the residents will 
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almost exclusively enjoy. Anne-Maria Makhulu discussed this paradox in terms of the 
apartheid South African state that required black labor but constantly antagonized black 
peoples. By controlling their numbers within the cities in which they worked, the 
apartheid regime successfully pushed many black South Africans to live farther out in the 
margins of the South African metropolises, further embedding them in spatial and 
economic segregation (Makhulu 2015, 9). 
Much of Newell’s work on this individual accumulation and most of the 
journalism on migrants in the Sahara relies on the experiences and perspectives of young 
men. There is an almost exclusive focus on men, specifically young men, such that the 
concept of conspicuous consumption appears to be conspicuously gendered, and the 
representation of migrancy and migrant labor is equally gendered favoring men. Where 
are the women? According to Dély Ibrahim, the Algerian youth harass and attack both 
the men and “their wives”. Other reports of stranded migrants dying of starvation in the 
desert count women among the dead. For sure, women are there, in the desert and in the 
Saharatown, but where do they emerge in this scene? Where are their voices, their 
perspectives, their stories? They are not sitting at home doing nothing, that is certain, so 
what are they doing and how are they experiencing this existential compression, this vise 
of the Saharatown?  
Media attention and state policy have conspired to perpetuate the notion that most 
migrants are male, heavily gendering the figure of the migrant to be male. According to 
UN migration data from 2015, more than 40% of all migrants in the West African 
countries of Senegal, Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as the Central African countries of 
Chad and Cameroon were women (UN 2015; Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – Percentage Female Among all International Migrants 
 
 
 
Sarah Zimmerman writes that between 1908 and 1928, West African women 
accompanied “les tirailleurs sénégalais” and migrated to regional West African training 
centers and distant North African warzones in support of those infantrymen serving in the 
French colonial army. The participation of the “mesdames tirailleurs” during World War 
I military missions against Morocco, was viewed as essential to the campaign to “pacify” 
of the Morocco  (Zimmerman 2011). Women have been apart of trans-Saharan caravan 
trade for at least since the 19th century. Women organized commercial operations within 
market towns, traded across the Sahara by proxy, managed the estates of their deceased 
husbands and sometimes, traveled with the caravans (Lydon 2009); much of scholarship 
on travel through the Sahara, be it related to trade or migration, overlooks the substantial 
involvement of women. Where the entire rubric of critical race theory is inadequate, the 
theoretical perspective of intersectionality, a concept that articulates how different 
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identities including race and gender interact with each other and with institutions to 
marginalize people, is critical to the plight of black African life in Saharatown (Crenshaw 
1991). 
One of the participants at the Cinema Caravan, a woman, asked a question of one 
of the program facilitators concerning migration laws and visa requirements. This 
highlighted the dominant presence of woman at this event and the notice relatively small 
number of men in attendance. Linda noticed this too, and said mostly women attended the 
Cinema Caravans throughout Niamey. The stress on “throughout Niamey” provoked 
some thought about the other IOM sites of sensitization west of this southeastern part of 
the broader West to North Africa journey: Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso. Why do men 
not attend these Cinema Caravans in Niger? Is it because Niamey is just south of the 
foothold of the Nigérien Sahara, and the men coming from farther west within West 
Africa have already been “sensitized” to the perils of trans-Saharan migration? Inspired 
by this scene, however, I asked myself why so many women came. 
Contemplating their reasons for being at the event, I thought their interest in 
migration might lie in their social connections to migrants who have already traveled, and 
those who hope to do so, called pre-migrants in IOM-speak. Of course, perhaps some of 
the women are migrants themselves. Linda wasn’t really sure if the attendance pattern 
had to do with the fact that she is a woman and the women like to come to such events 
because Linda hosts them. Whatever the reasons for women being there, it is important to 
recognize that women are there. What can conspicuous consumption tell us about the 
lives of migrants living in squalid encampments in and around desert communities? 
Literature of the conspicuous consumption patterns of African migrants is heavily 
 57 
gendered, reflecting the abundance of male individual accumulation studies. Surely the 
young males featured in such ethnographic accounts are not the only migrants who 
collect material goods in an effort to be more than just a black migrant, to take up more 
space in the world? Women also collect things, right?! So again I ask, where are the 
migrant women and their stories in the 21st century Saharatown, especially with evidence 
that many women are migrants in this context (see Figure 2)? 
 
Continuities in (Ordering) Blackness 
In her work “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” 
Hortense Spillers provides a critically important disarticulation of body and flesh. In 
addition to being separate from each other, flesh comes before the body. Consequently, 
the body does not exist without flesh to which it binds, and therefore requires flesh and 
law of Man in order to come online and perform its two central tasks: 1) imprison and 
order flesh, and 2) reproduce and reinforce the juridical law and condition of Man. Using 
Spillers here, the elements of the vise of compression reveal themselves again. However, 
the body does not explicitly define that flesh. Flesh is much more. Saidiya Hartman 
describes flesh as the most elemental matter of being (Hartman 2016). It is a “zero degree 
of social conceptualization” that remains hidden by “the reflexes of iconography”, the 
conditions of representation and elision of discourse (Spillers 1987, 67). The figure of the 
migrant is a composite of iconographies, symbols and juridical imprints, a category of 
flesh out-of-place whose body must be ordered. 
The body is ordered by law to remain fixed, firmly keeping flesh in place within 
the social-juridical, predetermined (by whites) spaces for black peoples. In Black 
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Metropolis, the extensive sociological study of early 20th century black life in a large 
American urban city, Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake thoroughly traced the historical 
trajectory of blacks moving during the Great Migration out of the South to find work and 
make life in northern cities. With increasing numbers of blacks moving into previously 
all-white towns in the North and Midwest (at least nominally, as small numbers of blacks 
lived in such towns as domestic workers for whites during Reconstruction; Loewen 2005), 
blacks consolidated into areas of the city that were socially and geographically 
disadvantaged with respect to the social, institutional and economic resources that were 
controlled by whites, and situated in white parts of town. According to Cayton and Drake, 
the use of the “color-line” by whites trying to restrict movement of blacks in Midwestern 
cities like Chicago and prevent them from using certain amenities was quite common in 
the mid-20th century. In Chicago, it was quite common for white bartenders to refuse to 
serve black patrons and for white waitresses to ignore black customers in restaurants; 
these instances occurred when blacks left the confines of the black belt (a long, densely-
populated stretch of black neighborhoods, residences, institutions and businesses around 
Chicago which emerged from the migration of blacks from the rural plantations of the 
South to the urban Midwest) and “invaded” (according to some whites) the institutions of 
other parts of the city (Cayton and Drake 1945). Blacks were told to stay in their place 
and the implicit application and enforcement of Jim Crow segregation dictates ensured 
this, or in other words, the racist society ordered their flesh. 
We can learn from America’s Great Migration, as to what consequences lie ahead 
for black migration into non-black lands. The Great Migration differs markedly from this 
trans-Saharan migration, especially in terms of the modes of travel afforded to black 
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Americans (e.g. trains and personal automobiles, compared to overland truck travel for 
black Africans), the duration of time spent in towns or stops on the journey out of the 
South (i.e. black Americans may have stayed a few hours to one night at a motel or 
friend’s house before completing their journey the next day, whereas black Africans may 
toil in Saharatowns for months before gaining enough money to move on) and the 
relative durations of the migrations for individuals (black many Americans completed 
their migrations to the North in a manner of days, yet some black Africans make it from 
their West African homelands to the shores of the Mediterranean after many months). 
However, the two migrations maintain strong similarities with current trans-Saharan 
migration of blacks across the desert, most notably the long and physically dangerous 
routes to promised lands, as well as the necessary stops on the journeys, be they in small 
towns, or on the sides of the road. Comparison of the American ghetto with the ghettos of 
Saharatowns is not without limitations. The experiences of American ghetto residents 
differ across the U.S. and also across countries (Small 2008). Loïc Wacquant highlighted 
this issue in Urban Outcasts where he concluded the surface commonalities between U.S. 
ghettos and the banlieues of Paris “conceal deep structural and functional differences… 
We are in fact comparing sociospatial specimens of different species—urban ‘apples and 
oranges,’ as it were” (Wacquant 2008). This is not say that a comparison between U.S. 
ghettos and Saharatown ghettos can not be conducted, but understanding the limitations 
is essential to undergoing such a comparative study. The phenomenon of black migrants 
moving into non-black (specifically white) areas is similar to black Africans crossing the 
Sahara into North Africa, the lands of Bédouins or white Africans. In the Great Migration 
of the early 20th century and in the current scenario of black Africans traversing the 
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Sahara to North Africa, blacks were and are some of the largest sources of voluntarily 
immigrating cheap, exploitable labor for dominant white populations in post-
reconstruction America and contemporary Europe respectively, and now, Arab-Bédouin 
Saharatowns. 
 
Encoded Anti-Blackness 
Article 21 of the Algerian labor code stipulates that “The employer can carry out 
the recruitment of immigrant workers under the conditions fixed by the legislation and 
the regulation in force when there is not a national work force qualified,” however the 
code does not provide any provision for determining when there is no qualified national 
work force (my translation; Code du Travail 1990). Following a November 
announcement by the Algerian government pledging to end illegal immigration to 
Algeria, authorities have continued to raid several neighborhoods in the capital Algiers, 
arresting men, women and children in the ghettos throughout the city. Most of these 
arrested migrants are black Africans and authorities have continued to send them to 
detention camps in the south of the country, Tamanrasset being one of them. This 
removal of black African migrants from the coastal cities and subsequent detention in 
desert towns in southern Algeria have contributed to the glut of black migrants in 
Saharatowns, exacerbating racial tensions between blacks and Bédouins. Ironically, it is 
this southward movement, this “detention migration” that buttresses the utility of the 
Saharatown, as both intermediate stage of a long, northward journey and as dumping 
grounds for those expelled from the urban areas near the Mediterranean.  
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"As soon as you open the door, they take you away. I was taken with all my 
luggage, everything was stolen: the computer, the things in the house, the refrigerator, the 
money – they took everything," said a migrant who was sent from Algiers to a camp in 
Tamanrasset. Prior to this crackdown, conditions for migrants in Algiers were already 
difficult, again, with migrants living in derelict structures and being exploited by 
employers. "Our life boils down to that. We carry bags of sand [and] stones. We do all 
the jobs nobody wants to do," one unnamed Guinean migrant told France 24. The 
Guinean added, "The bosses call us 'comrades', [and] we have the impression that it 
means 'slaves'. But we have no choice, they are the only ones who accept to give jobs to 
illegal migrants." The government crackdown against these predominantly black 
migrants has been described as “the biggest hunt for the black man since independence” 
(The New Arab 2016). One cannot deny the racial dynamic of this operation and the 
Saharatown as dumping ground because of its remote and desert location is critical to this 
operation. 
According to Algerian police, approximately 150,000 migrants have fled war and 
economic difficulties in their home countries to live in Algeria's large cities, yet only 
about 7,000 people hold refugee status in Algeria. Using Spillers here, the elements of the 
vise of compression reveal themselves again. The juridical conditions that order and 
shape black American life for Spillers parallel the set of anti-migration policies and the 
legal foundation that does not allow undocumented workers to achieve official 
employment in the Saharatowns. The juridical apparatus of a Saharatown such as 
Tamanrasset does not protect the rights of undocumented migrants to pursue employment, 
but actually indemnifies Algerian employers who discriminate against black African 
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migrant workers, due to the vague wording and lack of enforcement of the law. The 
approximately 7,000 people with refugee status in Algeria demonstrates how few 
migrants are given legal documentation that would protect them and allow them to exist 
within the veil of the law in Algeria. With authorities raiding tenements, confiscating and 
stealing belongings from migrants, forcibly removing migrants from their domiciles and 
dumping them in the Sahara, the law does not protect migrants; to the contrary, it actually 
persecutes them, and the Saharatown is crucial to completing this circle of anti-black 
movement. It is simultaneously representative of reverse movement (i.e. from northern 
coastal metropolis to southern, rural, remote desert oasis town) and the cessation of 
movement (i.e. the place where dreams of moving northward are deferred and sometimes 
altogether forgotten as hope of leaving becomes increasingly untenable). It is also 
simulacrum of the large towns of both the Maghreb and of Europe, a cruel twist on 
colonial mimesis, in which the former French colonies of the Maghreb imitate the former 
colonial powers of Europe in dehumanizing and exploiting black peoples. Homi Bhabha 
describes colonial mimicry as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial 
power and knowledge production (Bhaba 1997). Black migrants are caught in this 
mirroring of colonial powers and compressed along the way from one to the other. 
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CONCLUSION 
Considerations of Black Life in Future Studies of Saharatowns 
Saharatowns offer these features and their associated issues, and such dynamic 
social spaces merit much more scholarly attention and rigorous investigation. Much 
journalism coverage and anecdotal evidence point to the Saharatown being a dystopian 
site of oppression and disillusion, a space where dreams are deferred. However, it may 
simultaneously represent a space of limited opportunity and ephemeral hope. The 
Saharatown evokes images of Black African life caught in transit, with the Saharatown 
simultaneously prefigured as stepping stone to imagined futures and departure gate for 
waiting passengers to elsewhere. Are they themselves the object or mise en scène of 
imagined futures for black African migrants? In other words, are the Saharatowns found 
within aesthetics and realities of Afrofuturistic worlds? What if the Saharatown offers 
more than expected, a glimpse into “a possible” future for black migrants in the “North”? 
What if the Saharatown is a coincidental mimetic representation of European towns that 
may later exploit black Africans migrants, be they documented or otherwise? What other 
secrets might the Saharatowns hold, and what effects might those revelations have on the 
lives of migrants, the conditions they may face and how those circumstances translate to 
conditioned futures? Unlocking and releasing the vice grip could reveal how powerful 
social systems and can be effectively undermined and upended to the benefit of migrants 
and the lives of other compressed peoples. Yet, in order to do this, we need to understand 
how that vice grip is made, precisely how it functions, and under what conditions it 
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operates. This theoretical exercise was an attempt to offer prescriptive guidance for 
addressing a glaring gap in the anthropological literature on migration and blackness in 
Africa. I specifically highlight the need for in depth study of black migrant women and 
the types of conspicuous consumption and individual accumulation they perform as they 
make life in anti-black conditions that might also marginalize them as women. Here, I 
also called attention to the role of non-governmental institutions and the various funding 
apparatuses that buttress them in perpetuating the transnational circumstances that lead to 
precarious situations for black Africans. 
Scholarship of African migration through the Sahara has focused, and 
understandably so, on the global reasons, or push-pull factors, motivating migration 
through that space. Understanding the parameters under which people decide to move 
through sand and storm to North Africa and Europe, but work needs to be done on how 
people survive the sand and hate in the many spaces and long stretches of time before 
reaching the coast. An analysis of Saharatown compression and how it specifically 
targets black Africans can provide a framework for studying how Africans and blackness 
bridge incommensurabilities of different worlds and social conditions to make lives for 
themselves. Black migration and Saharatowns are the elements that combine to set of the 
conditions of the vice (Saharatown compression) and the black response (either double 
failure or mobilizing hope to escape). Trans-Saharan migration constitutes more than 
movement through desert and sand. Within the realities of time and space for black 
African migrants that I described here persists a strong element of “un-movement” or 
“non-movement” that also articulates the phenomenon of trans-Saharan migration. That 
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is, the precarious stuckedness in the Saharatown is very much a part of the “migration” 
story (Millar 2014; Missbach 2015; Vogt 2016). 
How do migrants live in these Saharatowns, for which there are few jobs for them 
and much discrimination against them? Some migrants receive monies from their 
families supporting their journeys, but what happens when those funds arrive infrequently 
and often, come up short? Many journal reports have documented the conditions of life 
for black Africans in Saharatowns, as they live in squalid ghetto quarters and work in 
insalubrious, dangerous jobs. I have failed to come across any academic studies that have 
examined the actual lives of black migrants in these spaces, in these conditions. I believe 
that the Saharatowns can tell us so much more. How do black migrants modulate their 
dreams and their objectives in these towns? How do the towns affect how black migrants 
recalibrate their dreams and hopes? Under a double failure, what happens to the morale 
and hopes of migrants experiencing it? Within the space of these towns and the double 
failure they inaugurate may emerge what Nadia El Shaarawi calls liminality. This 
liminality is a condition of living in transit in which migrants experience a disjunction 
between their expectations about exile and its realities that contribute to an altered 
experience of time, in which the future becomes particularly uncertain and life, unstable 
(El Shaarawi 2015). Is the significance of the double failure, getting stuck in a town 
unable to leave and failing to reach one’s intended destination, a compounded 
demoralizing failure, an anti-hope? How do migrants experience this time, or time lost, 
and what effects does this temporal experience have on their dreams and actions? 
These dynamic Saharatowns exert some considerable pressures upon black 
migrants who happen to inhabit them, and these black peoples fail to realize their dreams 
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or dream themselves out of the desert. However, they may simultaneously represent for 
many the best way out and a way forward towards a more prosperous life. If going to the 
Saharatowns means one is trying to get to the other side of the desert, then the 
Saharatowns are critical to the trans-Saharan hope for many black Africans migrating 
through the desert scape. Only time will tell what happens to people at the end of their 
journeys, but ethnographic inquiry can provide a picture of what happens in the middle. 
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